State of Utah v. Lyle C. Hendricks : Brief of Respondent by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1989
State of Utah v. Lyle C. Hendricks : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Paul Van Dam; Attorney General; Attorney for Respondent.
Bernard L. Allen; Attorney for Appellant.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Utah v. Hendricks, No. 890255 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/1820
UTAH cuun« v*r «. . — 
BRIEF 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
K F U 
50 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
255" 
.AID 
DOCKSWO-0-
v. 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
LYLE C. HENDRICKS, 
Defendant-Apellant, 
Case No. 880277 
Priority 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION OF AGGRAVATED 
ROBBERY, A FIRST DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION 
OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-302 (1978), IN THE 
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE 
DAVID E. ROTH, JUDGE, PRESIDING. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
BARBARA BEARNSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Respondent 
BERNARD L. ALLEN 
2568 Washington Boulevard 
Suite 203 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorney for Appellant 
FIL 
APR 101989 
Cterk, Supreme Court, Utah 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
LYLE C. HENDRICKS, 
Defendant-Apellant. 
Case No. 880277 
Priority 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION OF AGGRAVATED 
ROBBERY, A FIRST DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION 
OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-302 (1978), IN THE 
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE 
DAVID E. ROTH, JUDGE, PRESIDING. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
BARBARA BEARNSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Respondent 
BERNARD L. ALLEN 
2568 Washington Boulevard 
Suite 203 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorney for Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 2 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 7 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I DEFENDANT WAS INFORMED OF, AND WAIVED, HIS 
RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT PURSUANT TO MIRANDA, 
AND HIS SUBSEQUENT CONFESSION WAS PROPERLY 
ADMITTED AT TRIAL 9 
POINT II THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH 
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT DEFENDANT'S 
GUILT OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY 17 
POINT III DEFENDANT HAD COMPETENT REPRESENTATION BY 
ABLE COUNSEL AND WAS NOT DENIED HIS RIGHT TO 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 20 
POINT IV THE RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S 
CLAIM OF PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 24 
CONCLUSION 25 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
Arizona v. Gilbreath, 107 Ariz. 318, 487 P.2d 385 (1972), 
cert, denied, 406 U.S. 921 (1972) 16 
Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101 (Utah 1983) 22 
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) 12 
Hayes v. State, 633 P.2d 751 (Okla. Crim. 1981) 16 
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) 13 
Layton City v. Noon, 736 P.2d 1035, 1040 (Utah 
App. 1987) 22 
Maquire v. United States, 396 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1968), 
cert, denied, 393 U.S. 1099 (1969) 16 
State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341 (Utah 1984) 24 
State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988) 11 
State v. Bolsinqer, 699 P.2d 1214 (Utah 1985) 14 
State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342 (Utah 1985) 17 
State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296 (Utah 1986) 21 
State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401 (Utah 1986) 21 
State v. Gabaldon, 735 P.2d 410 (Utah App. 1987) 19 
State v. Gardner, 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 12 (Utah 1989)... 21,23 
State v. Geary, 707 P.2d 645 (Utah 1985) 21 
State v. Julian, No. 870351, slip op. (Utah 
March 28, 1989) 21 
State v. Kaae, 30 Utah 2d 73, 513 P.2d 435 (1973) 12 
State v. Lenon, 570 P.2d 901 (Mont. 1977) 15 
State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986) 22 
State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56 (Utah 1982) 22 
State v. Martinez, 595 P.2d 897 (Utah 1979) 14 
State v. Meinhart, 617 P.2d 355 (Utah 1980) 12 
-ii-
State v. Moore, 697 P.2d 233 (Utah 1985) 11,12 
State v. Olmos, 712 P.2d 287 (Utah 1986) 21 
State v. Ricci, 655 P.2d 690 (Utah 1982) 12 
State v. Wareham, No. 860312, slip op. (Utah, 
March 13, 1989) 24 
State v. Watts, 639 P.2d 158 (Utah 1981) 12 
State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12 (Utah App. 1988) 22,23 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, reh'g denied, 
467 U.S. 1267 (1984) 21 
United States v. Hopkins, 433 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1970), 
cert, denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971) 16 
United States v. Suggs, 755 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir. 1985)... 10 
STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1978) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302(1) (a) (1978) 18 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302(3) (1978) 18 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-2 ( 2) (a) (Supp. 1988) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(h) (1987) 1 
-iii-
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
LYLE C. HENDRICKS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 880277 
Priority 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of aggravated robbery, 
a first degree felony, following a trial by jury in the Second 
Judicial District Court, in and for Weber County, State of Utah, 
David E. Roth, judge, presiding. This Court has jurisdiction in 
this appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-2(2)(a) (Supp. 1988) 
§ 78-2-2(3)(h) (1987) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether defendant's confession was properly 
admitted at trial. 
2. Whether the evidence was sufficient to establish 
defendant's guilt of aggravated robbery. 
3. Whether defendant received effective assistance of 
counsel. 
4. Whether the prosecutor engaged in prosecutorial 
misconduct. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-302 (1978): Aggravated Robbery -
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if 
in the course of committing robbery, he: 
(a) Uses a firearm or a facsimile of a 
firearm, knife or a facsimile of a knife or a 
deadly weapon; or 
(b) Causes serious bodily injury upon 
another. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a felony of the 
first degree. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act 
shall be deemed to be "in the course of 
committing a robbery" if it occurs in an 
attempt to commit, during the commission of, 
or in the immediate flight after the attempt 
or commission of a robbery. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction on a charge of 
aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, following a jury 
trial before the Honorable Judge David E. Roth on January 20 and 
21, 1988. Defendant was sentenced to serve a term of not less 
than five years and which may be for life at the Utah State 
Prison, with an additional one-year enhancement for the use of a 
firearm. Notice of Appeal was filed in the Second District Court 
on February 26, 1988. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
LeMoyne Murray, owner of Murray's Pharmacy, was working 
with employee Evelyn Blackwell on the afternoon of December 8, 
1987, at about 3:30 or 3:35, when a man wearing acid washed levis 
and a white sweatshirt, later identified as defendant, came into 
the pharmacy (T. 22, 44, 15, 37). He walked back into the 
section of the pharmacy where only employees are allowed—an area 
sectioned off from the remainder of the store by a gate (T. 15). 
He pointed a large, uzi-type gun at Mr. Murray's head (T. 15) and 
demanded all of his class II narcotics (T. 15, 37). Mr. Murray 
advised defendant that he no longer carried class II narcotics 
(T. 15). Defendant told Mr. Murray that he was, as Mr. Murray 
put it, "serious about this F thing" (T. 17). Mr. Murray showed 
defendant that the drawer where he used to keep his class II 
narcotics was empty (T. 17), whereupon defendant turned around 
and left the store as he made a parting comment to the effect 
that he was not serious anyway (T. 17, 37). Despite this 
comment, both Mr. Murray and Ms. Blackwell were very frightened 
and believed that defendant was serious when he demanded the 
class II drugs at gunpoint (T. 21, 40). As soon as defendant 
left the pharmacy, Mr. Murray called the police, and Ms. 
Blackwell went to the front of the store and saw the defendant 
drive away in a blue Suzuki Samurai (T. 41). She relayed this 
information to Mr. Murray, who immediately gave the vehicle 
description along with a description of the suspect to the police 
(T. 18, 42). 
The police immediately acted on this information and 
soon observed a vehicle that matched the description of the 
suspect vehicle (T. 55, 68). Without provocation, the suspect 
vehicle began to accelerate away from the police and tried to 
evade them when they put on overhead lights and siren (T. 55, 56, 
61). The two occupants bailed out of the vehicle while it was 
still moving (T. 56) and officers began foot pursuit (T. 57, 77, 
90). While officers were pursuing the suspects, another officer 
secured the vehicle and observed in plain view on the back seat 
an open case with a foam cut out in the shape of a small machine 
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gun (T. 64). The officer then secured the case and observed a 9 
millimeter Cobra handgun protruding from under the seat along 
with two full clips of ammunition (T. 65-67). The car was 
registered to defendant (T. 69). 
Officers pursued the suspects into a residential area, 
where defendant was located hiding on a balcony of a building and 
then surrendered to police (T. 79, 92). The second individual, 
Sal Echeverria, was located in a care center hiding in a bathroom 
vanity (T. 89). 
Defendant was given his Miranda warning upon arrest by 
Detective Miner (T. 97). He was taken to the police station for 
a lineup (T. 79, 94). While awaiting the lineup, he stated he 
wanted to talk with Detective Zimmerman (T. 81). Detective 
Zimmerman, in the presence of Detective Miner, again advised 
defendant of his Miranda warning (T. 83). Defendant said he 
understood the rights and still wished to speak (T. 83). During 
the conversation, defendant denied involvement in the incident 
(T. 84). Defendant claimed that he had gone to a friend's house, 
whose name he did not know, at 3 p.m. (T. 84). Sal Echeverria 
later came to the house and borrowed defendant's Samurai and was 
gone for about fifteen to twenty minutes (T. 84). When Sal 
returned, defendant said that he and Sal went for a drive (T. 
84). When Sal saw the cops, he began to evade them (T. 84). 
Defendant said he did not know why Sal was running, but he was 
scared so he took off too (T. 84). When Detective Zimmerman was 
informed during the interview that he had a phone call, he told 
defendant his story would not fly and began to leave the room (T. 
86). Defendant then said that he had gone in the pharmacy, but 
there was no robbery. He then became upset and said, "that's it, 
that's all I'm telling you" (T. 86). The questioning ceased, but 
defendant added that he had gone into the pharmacy at about 2:30 
or 2:45 to obtain some cold medicine (T. 87). Detective Miner 
was not present when defendant stopped answering questions (T. 
109). 
At the lineup, defendant was positively identified by 
both Mr. Murray and Ms. Blackwell (T. 22, 43, 95, 96). Defendant 
was represented by private counsel, Mr. Stockdale, at the lineup 
(T. 80). Subsequently, defendant was not able to retain private 
counsel and was represented by a public defender (T. 105, 122, 
123) . 
Later the same night, defendant contacted Detective 
Miner and asked him to come to talk with him (T. 125). Miner 
asked what Stockdale had told him about talking to the police; 
defendant said he had been told not to, but added words to the 
effect of "forget that" (T. 125). 
The next morning, while at his arraignment, defendant 
again asked Detective Miner to talk with him (T. 98). In the 
presence of a public defender, who defendant indicated was 
representing him, he told Miner that he wished to talk with him 
(T. 98). According to court records, defendant was represented 
at the time by Scott Jensen (T. 115); defendant acknowledged that 
he had an attorney during this time, although he could not 
remember his name (T. 116). During the course of this 
conversation, defendant admitted going into the pharmacy with a 
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gun (T. 101). He also admitted that he went into the pharmacy 
with the intent of obtaining drugs (T. 101). Additionally, he 
stated that he had been taking cocaine all day and that he needed 
the drugs to stay high so he would follow through on a plan to 
kill an individual with whom he had had a previous confrontation 
(T. 101). 
Defendant relied on his privilege against self 
incrimination and did not testify or present evidence at trial 
(T. 124). Following presentation of the evidence, there was a 
discussion in chambers regarding the statement made to Detective 
Miner on the morning of the arraignment (T. 115-17). Mr. Laker, 
defendant's trial counsel, was aware that the statements were in 
the police reports and would likely be introduced at trial (T. 
115), and he objected to their admission into evidence at the 
time they were introduced (T. 99). The Court indicated that 
based upon the evidence before him, the statements were 
admissible. Regardless, he gave Mr. Laker the opportunity to 
present evidence, from Scott Jensen specifically, to show that 
the statements were inadmissible (T. 116). The next day, Mr. 
Laker informed the court that he had spoken with Scott Jensen and 
that Jensen had interviewed and had contact with defendant prior 
to the time defendant talked with Detective Miner (T. 122-23). 
Although Jensen may not have been aware that defendant talked 
with Detective Miner, Mr. Laker stated Jensen was present at the 
time and represented him during the arraignment (T. 123). Mr. 
Jensen agreed to come to court to make these representations to 
the court, but in view of the voluntariness of the confession, 
Mr. Laker chose not to have Jensen do so (T. 123). 
Following deliberations, the jury returned a verdict of 
guilty to the charge of aggravated robbery (R. 42). Defendant 
was sentenced to a term of five years to life at the Utah State 
Prison, with an additional year enhancement for the use of a 
firearm (R. 49). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant was advised at the time of his arrest of his 
Miranda rights by Detective Miner prior to being taken to the 
police station for a lineup. While awaiting the lineup 
procedures, defendant indicated his desire to speak about the 
case with Detective Zimmerman. He was again advised of his 
rights and waived them, and during the course of the interview, 
he denied any involvement in the robbery. His statement was 
inconsistent and when he was pressed by Detective Zimmerman, he 
refused to speak any further but then added an additional detail 
about his previous activity. The defendant was left alone by the 
police at that point. 
The next morning, while represented by an attorney who 
was present with him at the arraignment, defendant initiated a 
conversation with Detective Miner where he admitted to his 
culpability in the crime. Defendant was represented by attorney 
Scott Jensen, according to court records. He admitted that he 
went into the store with a gun to get drugs. Detective Miner did 
not give the defendant a renewed warning during this 
conversation. 
The statement was voluntary, and therefore, admissible 
at trial. The court should look to several factors in deciding 
the need for a renewed warning. First, the time lapse between 
the initial and subsequent interrogation; second, whether the 
subsequent interrogation was with another officer; and third, 
whether the subsequent interrogation was initiated by the suspect 
or the police. Looking to these factors, a renewed warning was 
not required at the subsequent interview. 
The facts of this case overwhelmingly point to 
defendant's guilt. The evidence supported the jury's conclusion 
that the defendant committed aggravated robbery. The evidence 
was not so insubstantial or inconclusive that a reasonable person 
could not have reached a guilty verdict beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
The defendant was provided effective assistance of 
counsel. Defendant has failed to show that another attorney in 
his counsel's position would have pursued any different course of 
action during trial. Defendant has failed to meet his burden of 
showing that his counsel rendered deficient performance in some 
demonstrable manner, or that he was prejudiced by his counsel's 
alleged inefficiency. 
The record is totally devoid of support for defendant's 
contention that the prosecutor engaged in prosecutorial 
misconduct. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT WAS INFORMED OF, AND WAIVED, HIS 
RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT PURSUANT TO MIRANDA, 
AND HIS SUBSEQUENT CONFESSION WAS PROPERLY 
ADMITTED AT TRIAL. 
Defendant urges this Court to overturn his conviction 
due to the admission of a statement made by him to a police 
officer during a conversation initiated by defendant. While 
defendant was at the scene of his arrest, Detective Miner advised 
him of his Miranda rights, defendant responded that he knew them 
and did not do anything wrong (T. 97). A short time later, while 
at the jail awaiting a lineup, defendant made statements to 
Detective Zimmerman; he was told not to say anything until he was 
advised of his Miranda rights; defendant responded, "I know my 
Miranda rights" (T. 81-82). Nevertheless, in the presence of 
Detective Miner, Detective Zimmerman again advised defendant of 
his Miranda rights. He waived the rights, and specifically 
stated that he understood the rights and wished to speak. 
Defendant then told the detectives of his earlier activities of 
the day, and denied committing the robbery. 
Later that night, defendant initiated contact with 
Detective Miner; when asked what his attorney had told him 
regarding talking to the police, defendant said words to the 
effect of "forget that" (T. 97, 125). The next morning, 
defendant was arraigned (T. 98). During the arraignment, he was 
represented by Scott Jensen (T. 98, 115). Detective Miner was 
present at the jail, and defendant again initiated contact with 
him (T. 97). While standing next to the doorway with his 
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attorney, defendant asked Detective Miner if he could talk with 
him (T. 98). They went to one of the jail interview rooms; 
Jensen was present initially, and went back and forth between 
arraignments and the interview until it was time for defendant to 
be arraigned (T. 98, 100). During the interview, defendant 
confessed to the crime (T. 101). 
The afternoon prior to his confession, defendant was 
advised of his rights by two police officers, including the one 
to whom he confessed, who was also present the second time 
defendant was advised. Defendant had specifically stated that he 
knew his rights, that he understood them, and that he wished to 
talk (T. 83). Defendant did not specifically claim at trial, nor 
does he assert in his brief, that his statements were 
involuntary. He simply claims, citing United States v. Suggs, 
755 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir. 1985), that after defendant terminated 
the earlier interview, he should have been re-Mirandized prior to 
asking him questions about the case (AB 7-8). He claims the 
second interview was "too remote in time and in fact a totally 
distinct situation involving a separate officer" and that Miner 
should have contacted defendant's attorney before the interview 
( (AB 8). Suggs does not support defendant's contention; the 
eleventh circuit upheld the trial court's admission into evidence 
of the defendant's confession. The court noted that if the 
incriminating statement was made in response to interrogation 
after the defendant had invoked his right to remain silent, the 
statement would not been inadmissible. The court continued that 
M[v]oluntary incriminating statements, however, not made in 
response to an officer's questioning are freely admissible. Id. 
at 1541 (citations omitted). 
Defendant's contentions are without merit. First, the 
second interview, which defendant, not the officers, initiated, 
was less than twenty-four hours after the first interview and 
was, therefore, not remote in time. Second, the interview was 
not a totally separate situation; detective Miner was present 
when defendant was advised by Detective Zimmerman of his Miranda 
rights for the second time and was present for part of the 
interview (T. 83). Finally, defendant's attorney was present 
when defendant asked to talk to Detective Miner and even 
accompanied them to the interview room (T. 98, 100). Under these 
circumstances, the officer was not required to give defendant a 
"fresh" Miranda warning prior to talking with defendant. 
Although defendant does not specifically claim that his 
confession was involuntary, he asserts that the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly determined that the voluntariness of statements made 
in a custodial interrogation is determined by the adequacy of the 
Miranda warning (AB 6). He claims that when defendant ended the 
first interview, his action ended his knowing waiver of his 
Miranda rights (AB 7). 
The prosecution must prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the confession was voluntary. State v. Bishop, 753 
P.2d 439 (Utah 1988). This Court has consistently held that in 
deciding whether a confession is voluntary, it will look to the 
"totality of the circumstances" and reverse only when the trial 
court has abused its discretion. See State v. Moore, 697 P.2d 
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233 (Utah 1985); State v. Ricci, 655 P.2d 690, 692 (Utah 1982); 
State v. Watts, 639 P.2d 158, 160 (Utah 1981); State v. Meinhart, 
617 P.2d 355 (Utah 1980); State v. Kaae, 30 Utah 2d 73, 513 P.2d 
435 (1973). Evidence sufficient to result in finding that the 
confession is involuntary must reveal "some physical or 
psychological force or manipulation that is designed to induce 
the accused to talk when he would not otherwise have done so." 
State v. Moore, 697 P.2d at 237. Thus, the confession must be 
the product of duress or coercion before the conviction will be 
reversed. 
In the instant case, the evidence demonstrated by at 
least a preponderance of the evidence that* the confession was not 
the product of any type of manipulation by the police, and that 
the confession was voluntary. The conversation was initiated by 
defendant (T. 97). Defendant's sole contention is that he should 
have been given a fresh Miranda warning prior to this 
conversation, since he had invoked his right to silence in an 
interrogation with Detective Zimmerman the previous evening. 
Defendant was advised of, understood and waived his rights during 
the interview (T. 82-83). While it is not out of the realm of 
possibility, it seems highly unlikely that he forgot these rights 
overnight. 
In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), the United 
States Supreme Court held that once an accused invokes his right 
to remain silent, the accused cannot be subjected to "further 
interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made 
available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further 
communication/ exchange, or conversations with the police." Id. 
at 484-85 (emphasis added). In Edwards, the defendant was 
arrested and taken to the station. He was advised of, and 
waived, his Miranda rights. He spoke to the police, but then 
specifically stated he wanted an attorney; the questioning then 
ceased. The next morning, two colleagues of the initial officer 
went to the jail to speak with Edwards. He said he did not want 
to speak with anyone but was told "he had" to. I^d. at 479. He 
was again advised of Miranda and said he would talk after listing 
to his accomplice's taped statement. After listening to the 
tape, he gave a statement in which he implicated himself. The 
Court stated that an accused must give a voluntary and knowing 
relinquishment of the right to counsel. Ici. at 482 , citing 
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). However, once an accused 
is informed of his rights, the accused may waive them. 1A. at 
484. The Court reasoned that it would be "inconsistent with 
Miranda and its progeny for the authorities, at their instance, 
to reinterrogate an accused in custody if he has clearly asserted 
his right to counsel." :id. at 485 (emphasis added). However, 
the Court noted that an accused is not powerless to countermand 
his election of the right to remain silent. If an accused 
initiates the conversation, the fifth and fourteenth amendments 
do not preclude the police from using the voluntary statements at 
trial, id. 
The United States Supreme Court has not addressed the 
issue of when a police officer must re-Mirandize an accused; 
however, it is clear from Edwards that even when an accused 
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invokes his right to remain silent, he is then free to change his 
mind, and if he initiates the conversation, the police may speak 
with him and use any incriminating statements at trial. 
This Court addressed the issue in State v. Martinez, 
595 P.2d 897 (Utah 1979), and held that once an accused had been 
advised of his Miranda rights at the time of the initial stop of 
his vehicle, it was not necessary to readvise the accused of his 
rights about one-half hour later after he had been placed in 
custody. This Court noted that it is "important to have in mind 
the origin and purpose of those rights," which was to safeguard 
against oppressive methods and abuses that led to unjust 
convictions. Jd. at 899. However, it is important not to 
distort the protections and impose unreasonable requirements upon 
police officers. Id.. The Court found that it would serve no 
purpose to require readvisement of rights one-half hour later. 
In considering the need to repeat Miranda warnings at 
subsequent interrogations, courts have looked to various factors. 
The most significant factor is whether the second interrogation 
was initiated by the police or by the defendant. In State v. 
Bolsinger, 699 P.2d 1214 (Utah 1985), the defendant was charged 
with murder. After failing a polygraph test, police continued to 
ask defendant to tell his side of the story, even though 
defendant repeatedly insisted he would not make a statement until 
he was represented by counsel. Nine hours later, the defendant 
initiated a conversation with police officers and confessed to 
The focus was, however, on whether an accused was entitled to a 
repeated warning once placed in actual custody, rather than the 
lapse of time between a warning and subsequent interrogation. 
the killing. While disapproving of the continued requests by 
police to tell his side of the story, the court allowed the 
confession: 
We find it significant that the defendant was 
left alone between 6:00 p.m. and 3:00 a.m., 
when Officer Thompson was summoned at the 
defendant's request . . . . Under the 
circumstances here, the trial judge could 
well have found that defendant initiated the 
subsequent communications with Thompson and 
that his statements amounted to a valid 
waiver of his fundamental right to counsel 
and were therefore admissible at trial. 
Id. at 1217-18. 
In the instant case, the police were even more 
circumspect in their dealings with defendant. When defendant 
stated he did not wish to continue the conversation in the 
previous interrogation, the questioning ceased (T. 86-87). His 
subsequent contact with police was on his own initiative (T. 98). 
An additional factor to be considered is the amount of 
time that has lapsed between the initial interrogation and 
subsequent interrogations. In State v. Lenon, 570 P.2d 901 
(Mont. 1977), the defendant was arrested for possession of 
dangerous drugs and taken to jail. He was advised of his Miranda 
rights at about 3 a.m. At 9 a.m. the same morning, without a 
fresh warning being given, the defendant executed a statement in 
response to police questions. The Court stated that such a brief 
time lapse between the verbal warning and the confession did not 
create a duty to repeat the warnings. The defendant had given 
every indication that he understood the rights, and under the 
"totality of the circumstances" the confession was voluntary and 
there was no need to repeat the warning. Ld. at 907. In Hayes 
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v. State, 633 P.2d 751 (Okla. Crim. 1981), the court held that 
after a defendant had been advised of and waived his Miranda 
rights at an initial interrogation, it was not necessary for the 
officers to readvise the defendant of his rights two days later 
when he initiated a second statement. 
Other courts have looked at time lapses from several 
hours to seven days and found that there was no need to repeat 
warnings. Arizona v. Gilbreath, 107 Ariz. 318, 487 P.2d 385 
(1972), cert, denied, 406 U.S. 921 (1972) (twelve hour interim); 
United States v. Hopkins, 433 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. 
denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971) (seven-day lapse); Maquire v. United 
States, 396 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1968), cert, denied, 393 U.S. 1099 
(1969) (three day lapse). In the instant case, defendant was 
given a complete Miranda warning which he said he understood on 
the evening he was arrested., The next morning, he initiated the 
conversation with Detective Miner and gave a second statement. 
This brief time lapse was not sufficient to require a renewed 
warning. The previous warning had not become stale in the 
interim. 
Additionally, courts should consider whether the 
interrogations were by different officers. In this case, 
Detective Miner did not conduct the first interrogation, but he 
was present for part of the interview, including when the 
defendant was advised of his rights and acknowledged that he 
understood them and wished to talk (T. 83). Detective Miner had 
also advised defendant of his rights upon arrest (T. 97), In 
this situation, Detective Miner knew that defendant understood 
his rights and had knowingly and intelligently waived them. 
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Considering these factors together, it is apparent from 
the totality of the circumstances of this case that the defendant 
was fully aware of his rights and that he knowingly and 
intelligently waived these rights when he voluntarily gave a 
statement to Detective Miner. The trial court did not abuse its 
discretion by admitting this statement into evidence and the 
introduction of the confession was not error. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH 
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT DEFENDANT'S GUILT 
OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY. 
Defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to 
convict him of the charge of aggravated robbery. This Court 
stated in State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342 (Utah 1985), that when a 
defendant claims the evidence was insufficient to sustain his 
conviction, an appellate court should limit the scope of its 
review. 
"We review the evidence and all inferences 
which may reasonably be drawn from it in the 
light most favorable to the verdict of the 
jury. We reverse a jury conviction for 
insufficient evidence only when the evidence, 
so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds 
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant committed the crime of which he 
was convicted." State v. Petree, Utah, 659 
P.2d 443, 444 (1983); accord State v. 
McCardell, Utah, 652 P.2d 942, 945 (1982). 
In reviewing the conviction, 
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we do not substitute our judgment for that of 
the jury "It is the exclusive function of 
the jury to weigh the evidence and to 
determine the credibility of the witnesses . 
. . ." State v. Lamm, Utah, 606 P.2d 229, 
231 (1980); accord State v. Linden, Utah, 657 
P.2d 1364, 1355 (1983). So long as there is 
some evidence, including reasonable 
inferences from which findings of all the 
requisite elements of the crime can 
reasonably be made, our inquiry stops. 
Ld. at 345. 
A person commits aggravated robbery when he uses, inter 
alia, a firearm or facsimile of a firearm in the course of 
committing a robbery. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302(1)(a) (1978). 
Further, the act is considered in the course of an aggravated 
robbery "if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the 
commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or 
commission of a robbery." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302(3) (1978). 
The evidence in this case is sufficient to establish beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant unlawfully and intentionally 
attempted to take drugs in the possession of Mr. Murray by means 
of force or fear, and during the course of the attempt he used a 
firearm. 
Mr. Murray and Ms. Blackwell were working in Murray's 
Pharmacy on the afternoon of December 8th when at about 3:30 p.m. 
defendant went into the pharmacy with a large uzi-type machine 
gun (T. 15, 37). He pointed the gun at Mr. Murray's head and 
demanded that Mr. Murray give him class II narcotics (T. 15, 37). 
Both Mr. Murray and Ms. Blackwell were in fear of the defendant 
(T. 21, 40). Mr. Murray explained to defendant that he no longer 
carried class II narcotics and showed him the empty drawer where 
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they used to be kept (T. 15). Defendant then turned around and 
left the store (T. 17). Ms. Blackwell went to the front of the 
store and saw defendant get into a blue Suzuki Samurai (T. 41). 
Mr. Murray immediately called the police and gave them a 
description of the defendant and the car (T. 18). 
Acting upon this information, the police found the 
suspect vehicle (T. 55, 60). Without provocation, the suspects 
tried to evade police officers (T. 55-56, 61). Defendant and 
another suspect jumped out of the car, which was registered to 
defendant (T. 69), and police began foot pursuit (T. 57, 77, 90). 
Defendant was located hiding on a balcony of a building and 
surrendered to the police (T. 79, 92). The suspect vehicle was 
registered to defendant (T. 69), and under the seat the officers 
found a 9 millimeter Cobra handgun with two clips of ammunition 
(T. 66-68). The gun was identified as the gun used by defendant 
in the aggravated robbery (T. 21, 38). 
Defendant was positively identified by Mr. Murray and 
Ms. Blackwell at a lineup (T. 22, 43), and at trial (T. 20, 44). 
The morning after his arrest, defendant admitted to Detective 
Miner that he went into the pharmacy with the intent of getting 
class II drugs that would help him to stay high (T. 101). 
The evidence overwhelmingly supports the jury's 
conclusion that defendant committed aggravated robbery. The 
evidence was not so insubstantial or lacking that a reasonable 
person could not have reached a guilty verdict beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Gabaldon, 735 P.2d at 412. 
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POINT III 
DEFENDANT HAD COMPETENT REPRESENTATION BY 
ABLE COUNSEL AND WAS NOT DENIED HIS RIGHT TO 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
Defendant claims that he was not provided effective 
assistance of counsel at all stages of trial. Defendant makes 
this claim in the brief filed by counsel as well as his pro se 
supplemental brief. 
Mr. Laker, defendant's trial counsel, did not file a 
motion in limine asking for the suppression of defendant's 
2 
confession. The trial court indicated that it would have been 
logical for defense counsel to file such a motion if he were 
concerned about the admissibility of the confession (T. 115). 
Further, defense counsel chose not to cross examine four of the 
witnesses (T. 44, 58, 87, 90). 
The remainder of defendant's factual contentions, in 
both his initial and supplemental briefs, are totally unsupported 
by the record and, therefore, should not be considered by this 
court. Not only does defendant fail to cite to the record, a 
cardinal rule of appellate procedure, if he made such an attempt 
he would be wholly unable, as the record does not support his 
3 
contentions. This Court should summarily affirm defendant's 
2 
Defense counsel made a timely and specific objection to the 
admission of the evidence during the course of the testimony (T. 
98-99). 
Defendant's supplemental brief contains a number of inaccurate 
factual claims and takes liberties with other aspects of the 
record; the State will not unduly reinforce the allegations by 
repeating them in detail here except to point out that 
defendant's claims about, inter alia, Mr. Murray's alleged prior 
criminal involvement, defense counsel's alleged failure to 
contact Mr. Jensen and false statements regarding his contact, 
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conviction where he fails to cite to the record in support of 
nearly all of his factual allegations- State v. Olmos, 712 P.2d 
287 (Utah 1986). Alternatively, if this Court declines to 
summarily affirm the conviction, it should review only those 
factual allegations that are based upon evidence contained in the 
record. State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296 (Utah 1986). 
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, reh'q 
denied, 467 U.S. 1267 (1984), the Supreme Court adopted a two-
part test to be used in examining claims based upon ineffective 
assistance of counsel. This Court has adopted this approach and 
stated the following in State v. Geary, 707 P.2d 645, 646 (Utah 
1985): 
In challenging a conviction on the ground of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, it is the 
defendant's burden to show: (1) that his 
counsel rendered a deficient performance in 
some demonstrable manner, and (2) that the 
outcome of the trial would probably have been 
different but for counsel's error. Codianna 
v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101 (Utah 1983). 
See also State v. Julian, No. 870351, slip op. (Utah March 28, 
1989); State v. Gardner, 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 12 (Utah 1989). 
Failure to meet either of these requirements will defeat a claim 
based on ineffectiveness of counsel. Additionally, the claims 
must be "sufficient to overcome the strong presumption that 
counsel rendered adequate assistance and exercised reasonable 
professional judgment." State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 
1986). Further, this Court will not second-guess a trial 
Cont. Detective Miner's alleged false testimony, and defense 
counsel's alleged assistance to the prosecution are totally 
unsupported by the record and must, therefore, be disregarded. 
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attorney's use of judgment as to trial tactics or strategy. 
Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1110 (Utah 1983); see also 
Layton City v. Noon, 736 P.2d 1035, 1040 (Utah App. 1987). 
In the instant case, the most substantive claim (and 
one of two claims supported by the record) defendant makes 
against counsel is his failure to file a pretrial motion to 
suppress defendant's confession. As discussed in Point I of this 
brief, defendant's confession was properly admitted at trial; 
therefore, in all likelihood, such a motion would have been 
failed. This Court has held that "failure of counsel to raise 
motions or objections that would be futile if raised does not 
constitute ineffective assistance. State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 
56, 58 (Utah 1982) abandoned in part on other grounds in State v. 
Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986); ^ee also State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 
12 (Utah App. 1988) . 
The defendant's burden is to show that representation 
falls below an objective standard of reasonableness. Frame at 
405. He must prove that "specific, identified acts or omissions 
fall outside of the wide range of professionally competent 
assistance." 1^. While the trial court suggested that it may 
have been prudent to file a pretrial motion to suppress the 
confession (the judge later said that such a motion likely would 
have failed [T. 117], and counsel also admitted that such a 
motion would have been futile [T. 123]), it was not requisite to 
do so. Given the circumstances surrounding defendant's 
confession, defendant has failed to demonstrate that another 
attorney in the same set of circumstances would have pursued a 
different course of action. 
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Defendant also questions counsel's failure to cross-
examine State witnesses. The record shows, however, that counsel 
cross-examined four out of the eight state witnesses (T. 24, 52, 
70, 103). Defendant fails to point out what information would 
have been brought out on cross-examination of the remaining 
witnesses. It is well settled that an appellate court "will not 
second guess a trial attorney's legitimate use of judgment as to 
trial tactics or strategy." State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12 (Utah 
App. 1988), citing Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1110 (Utah 
1983). A decision on whether to cross-examine is very firmly in 
the discretion of the trial attorney. Further, in this case, 
cross-examination of the four other witnesses would have produced 
nothing favorable to defendant, and would likely have served to 
simply reinforce their direct testimony. 
This Court need not reach the performance of the 
attorney in this case, however, since defendant has failed to 
show that he was prejudiced by his attorney's performance. In 
Frame, 723 P.2d at 405, this Court stated: 
We need not determine whether counsel's 
performance was deficient if defendant fails 
to satisfy his burden of showing that he 
suffered unfair prejudice as a result of the 
alleged deficiencies. As stated by the 
United States Supreme Court in Strickland; A 
court need not determine whether counsel's 
performance was deficient before examining 
the prejudice suffered by a defendant as a 
result of the alleged deficiencies. The 
object of an ineffectiveness claim is not to 
grade counsel's performance. If it is easier 
to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the 
ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which 
we expect will often be so, that course 
should be followed. 
See also State v. Gardner, 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 12 (Utah, 1989). 
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Defendant contends that the State would have failed to 
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he went into the 
pharmacy with the intent to rob Mr. Murray of his class II drugs 
if his confession had been suppressed. Even absent the 
confession, defendant has failed to show the result would have 
been different. To prevail, a defendant must: 
show that but for the alleged deficiencies of 
counsel there exists any reasonable 
probability that the jury's verdict would 
have been different. He [must show] that the 
adversarial process of the trial was so 
undermined that the jury could not have 
produced a just result. 
Frame, at 405. As detailed above, even absent the confession, 
evidence of defendant's guilt was substantial. A jury 
considering the remainder of the evidence could have reasonably 
found that defendant committed the crime of aggravated robbery. 
POINT IV 
THE RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S CLAIM 
OF PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT. 
Defendant's final contention, which is raised in his 
supplemental brief, is that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct 
because she used the allegedly false testimony of Detective Miner 
and misled the jury during closing argument. Defendant's claim 
that Detective Miner's testimony was false is not supported by 
the record; in fact, Detective Miner's testimony was totally 
uncontradicted as well as consistent. Further, all of the 
prosecutor's remarks in opening statement and closing argument 
were supported by the record. Defendant's failure to support his 
claim should result in summary affirmance. See State v. Wareham, 
No. 860312, slip op. (Utah, March 13, 1989); State v. Amicone, 
689 P.2d 1341 (Utah 1984). 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant, Lyle C. Hendricks, was properly 
convicted of aggravated robbery. For the foregoing reasons, and 
any additional reasons advanced at oral argument, the State of 
Utah respectfully requests that this Court affirm defendant's 
conviction. 
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